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 Healing the American Rift
 with New Zealand
 James M. McCormick*
 OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS, political and military relations between New
 Zealand and the United States have been ruptured over the issue of
 nuclear-armed ship visits and, more generally, as in the case of nuclear-
 powered ships, over the issue of nuclear power itself. Little progress had
 been made in resolving the outstanding political-military issues between
 the two countries or restoring the functioning of the ANZUS (Australia-
 New Zealand-United States) defense pact. In 1994 and early 1995, how-
 ever, the Clinton administration took some steps to begin to heal this rela-
 tionship. In doing so, the Clinton administration seems to be pursuing a
 dual track policy of closer political cooperation between the two coun-
 tries, even as the security relationship remains fissured. Such a policy may
 well assist in stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region and is not necessarily a dra-
 matic departure from that pursued by the U.S. in another area of the
 world: The United States has long tolerated a dual track policy toward
 France, with that country retaining its membership in NATO even as it
 refused to participate in the nuclear (and conventional) planning activi-
 ties of the alliance.
 The recent American foreign policy initiative toward New Zealand
 may be maintained and expanded with continued efforts on both sides
 and, arguably, at relatively low costs: Each side would enhance its inter-
 national standing by continuing to undertake measures to resolve this fes-
 tering issue. While the National government in New Zealand took several
 actions seemingly to prod the United States toward accommodation from
 1990 onward, the Clinton administration then made the key policy
 changes in 1994 and early 1995 to advance the process. With Republican
 majorities in Congress skeptical about America's global role and with a
 A good deal of the information for this paper was gathered during a three-month Fulbright
 lecturership at the University of Waikato in Hamilton, New Zealand. During that visit, I was fortu-
 nate to be able to conduct a series of interviews at the New Zealand Ministry of Defense, the New
 Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the U.S. Embassy in Wellington. In addition, I
 taught a course on international conflict resolution to New Zealand army officers at the Waiouru
 army base and gained additional insights into defense relations between the two countries from
 that experience. Finally, I am especially grateful to my colleague, Jorgen S. Rasmussen, for several
 key suggestions on the paper.
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 slim ruling majority government in New Zealand, the burden for more
 immediate progress will likely fall to the Clinton administration itself. In
 reality, however, with elections scheduled in both countries in 1996, real
 progress in ties will likely await those votes.
 In this paper, I explore the evolution of the dispute, and begin by pro-
 viding some background on the origins and nature of the disruption in
 ties. Next I analyze the impact of this rupture in several different policy
 areas between the two countries. Finally, I discuss the prospects for future
 restoration of ties between New Zealand and the United States.
 ANZUS AND THE RUPTURE IN RELATIONS
 The historical importance of the ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-
 United States) pact cannot be understated in New Zealand foreign policy.
 The treaty was the "first New Zealand signed with a foreign power, with-
 out the United Kingdom. "I In many ways, it was seen as a mark of inde-
 pendence for New Zealand, and it was also an important avenue for New
 Zealand to play a role in global politics.
 At the same time, the ANZUS pact was a source of controversy within
 New Zealand politics, almost from its inception.2 While the 1950s and
 1960s movements associated with "banning the bomb" and the Vietnam
 War surely raised questions about the ANZUS pact, the activities of the
 1970s brought the issue to the forefront. A recent analysis makes this
 point succinctly:
 The rise of the anti-nuclear movement in the 1970s increased the salience of
 the anti-ANZUS critique (SEATO now being moribund) in political life. The
 shift in the focus of anti-nuclear protest from a preoccupation with the
 French in the South Pacific, to a preoccupation with the presence of any
 nuclear weapons in the South Pacific, to a preoccupation with visits by
 nuclear-powered ships to New Zealand ports, brought the movement closer
 and closer to a point of difference with the United States and with New
 Zealand's membership of the ANZUS alliance.3
 Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, moreover, the Labour party
 struggled with the issue of ANZUS. In fact, in 1977, the party conference
 called for a "positive non-aligned foreign policy and withdrawal from all
 military alliances with nuclear weapons states," and in 1980, the party con-
 ference voted to withdraw from ANZUS.4 The party leadership, however,
 1 Malcolm McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy (Auckland: Auckland University Press,
 1993), p. 123.
 2 Ibid., pp. 178-204.
 3 Ibid., p. 193.
 4 Ibid., pp. 195 and 204.
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 continued to support ANZUS, even as it struggled with the antinuclear
 sentiment within its own party. The Muldoon government, despite some
 personal and political friction with the Carter administration, continued
 its support for ANZUS. Yet, political stirrings were evident, and some
 questioned continued slavish adherence to the pact.5 Moreover, these
 concerns were sustained throughout the early to mid-1980s.
 An integral part of American policy action in support of the ANZUS
 alliance (and the eventual source of friction and dispute) was the periodic
 visits of American naval vessels to New Zealand ports. According to The
 Safety of Nuclear Powered Ships, the official New Zealand government study
 on nuclear propulsion, the United States Navy visited New Zealand ports
 148 times from 1960 to 1984. Only ten of the U.S. Naval vessels were
 nuclear-powered during that time and constituted only thirteen of the
 total number of visits.6 Throughout this period, however, the official pol-
 icy of the United States on whether these ships were nuclear-armed was
 captured in the elegant phrase of "neither confirm nor deny (NCND)."
 This policy meant that the U.S. government would not address the ques-
 tion of whether nuclear weapons were aboard the visiting ships and used
 this ambiguity as a way to support its overall deterrent strategy. Such a
 policy position, however, was a real catalyst for galvanizing those opposed
 to nuclear weapons and nuclear power in New Zealand domestic politics.
 This opposition reached a peak in 1985, a year that proved critical to U.S.-
 New Zealand political and military relations. That year, in fact, marked
 the beginning of the formal rupture in ties between the two nations over
 nuclear issues and American policy.
 Early in 1985, the Labour government of David Lange rejected the
 visit by the USS Buchanan, when the Reagan administration refused to pro-
 vide information on whether the ship was nuclear-armed or not. The
 Reagan administration immediately proceeded to end political and mili-
 tary contacts with New Zealand and excluded it from the ANZUS alliance
 meetings as well. Yet, the administration did not go further. On the one
 hand, the American administration seemed determined to make an
 example of the New Zealand government over its policy position and
 sought to halt the "Kiwi disease" from spreading to other countries with a
 similar fear of nuclear weapons. After all, other countries (e.g.,Japan and
 5 Ibid, pp. 200-08.
 6 This study was initiated by the National government in December 1991 and it reported in
 December 1992 on the question of nuclear safety and the dangers posed by nuclear-powered ves-
 sels and nuclear energy generally to New Zealand. The full citation of the study is as follows:
 Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion, The Safety of Nuclear Powered Ships (Wellington, N.Z.:
 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, December 1992). The data on U.S. naval visits is
 described on pp. 183-87 with the summary data on nuclear-powered ship visits on p. 183.
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 South Korea) had an aversion to American ship visits, although they often
 simply neglected to enforce it.7 On the other hand, it did not want to
 destroy fully its ties with a long-time friend in the South Pacific by invok-
 ing even harsher measures (e.g., the use of economic sanctions). Indeed,
 the American administration stood firm against efforts by some members
 of the U.S. Congress to impose economic sanctions.8
 In 1987, the rupture took yet another turn as the Labour government
 policy was now enacted into law, and all ships - which were either
 nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered - were prohibited from visiting New
 Zealand ports. Specifically, the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarma-
 ment, and Arms Control Act of 1987 authorized the prime minister the
 right to "grant approval for the entry into internal waters of New Zealand
 by foreign warships if the Prime Minister is satisfied that the warships will
 not be carrying any nuclear explosive device upon their entry into the
 internal waters of New Zealand." The same discretion was afforded the
 prime minister regarding the landing of any foreign military aircraft in
 New Zealand as well. The act also took one other step against any nuclear
 presence in New Zealand by prohibiting nuclearpropelled ships from visit-
 ing the country as well: "Entry into the internal waters of New Zealand by
 any ship whose propulsion is wholly or partly dependent on nuclear
 power is prohibited."9
 In March 1990, a further entanglement in the relationship occurred.
 Undoubtedly with an eye to the upcoming election, the National party
 adopted an antinuclear stance, despite it being a long-time supporter of
 ANZUS and of close New Zealand-American ties. Still, when National
 actually won the 1990 election, the expectation was that the government
 would begin to move to shore up its ties with the Americans.10
 The transference of the issue from a government policy to a legisla-
 tively mandated action, however, complicated the rupture and made any
 7 For an excellent discussion of the rupture in relations and the possible impact of the New
 Zealand policy shift on nuclear ship visits on Japan, see Stuart McMillan, Neither Confirm Nor Deny
 (New York: Praeger, 1987), especially pp. 106-07 and pp. 140-41. Also see the discussion of nuclear
 ship policy of Norway, Iceland, andJapan on pp. 64-69.
 8 This action was in keeping with an understanding that American Secretary of State George
 Shultz had with Prime Minister David Lange after the 1984 elections. See McMillan, Neither
 Confirm, p. 96 on this point.
 9 "New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987," reprinted in
 Paul Harris and Stephen Levine with Margaret Clark,John Martin, and Elizabeth McLeay, The New
 Zealand Politics Source Book (Palmerson North: The Dunmore Press, 1992), p. 376.
 10 See, for exampleJohn Henderson, "New Zealand and the Other Pacific Islands," in Richard
 Kennaway andJohn Henderson, Beyond New Zealand II (Auckland: Longman Paul Limited, 1991),
 p. 25.
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 immediate change remote.11 Moreover, one of the initial - albeit not the
 only - requirements for accommodation and resolution of this issue for
 the American side has now become the repeal of this legislation. In this
 sense, accommodation or settlement of the issue would require more
 than a change in stated government policy; it would also require parlia-
 mentary action.12
 THE IMPACT OF THE RUPTURE ON NEW ZEALAND AND THE UNITED STATES
 The rupture in ties has had a discernible impact on both countries.13
 This impact can be seen in military and political arenas for both countries
 with the greater impact falling on New Zealand than on the United States.
 Interestingly, economic relations seem to have been less affected by this
 rupture.
 (a) Military Effects
 The military effects of the ANZUS rupture are probably the most
 immediate and observable over the past decade. For New Zealand, the
 crucial military impact has been the loss of training capabilities for its
 armed forces. Because New Zealand has been kept outside of the ANZUS
 exercises, such as the "Kangaroo" and "Blackpitch" exercises in Australia,
 it does not have the ability to make certain that its forces are maintained
 at as high a quality as those of similar countries. Indeed, in the view of
 many, the most effective military forces are those that operate within an
 alliance because it allows for the maintenance of performance standards
 across nations. Without the ANZUS pact, New Zealand is unable to apply
 those standards - standards that would place the military forces on an
 equal footing with those of NATO. Similarly, the interoperability of mili-
 tary equipment and personnel has been lost through this rupture in the
 relationship. Fewer operational standards - comparable to those of
 Britain or the U.S. - can now be systematically applied to the New
 Zealand military. In short, a legitimate concern is whether New Zealand's
 11 The U.S. Congress did, in fact, in 1987 pass the Broomfield Act which downgraded New
 Zealand status from an ally to a friend. See Richard Kennaway, "The ANZUS Dispute," in Richard
 Kennaway and John Henderson, Beyond New Zealand II (Auckland: Longman Paul Limited, 1991),
 pp. 70-71.
 12 For a lucid and critical assessment of New Zealand's rupture of ties with the U.S., see Ramesh
 Thakur, "Creation of the Nuclear-free New Zealand: Brinkmanship Without a Brink," Asian Survey,
 vol. 29 (October 1989), pp. 919-39.
 13 For earlier assessments of the impact of the rupture on the U.S. and New Zealand, see, for
 example, Henry S. Albinski, "The ANZUS Crisis: US Policy Implications and Responses," and Steve
 Hoadley, "New Zealand's National Interests, Defence Capabilities and ANZUS," in Jacob
 Bercovitch, ed., ANZUS zn Crisis: Alliance Management zn Internatzonal Affairs (Houndmills and
 London: The Macmillan Press, 1988), pp. 83-103 and 191-213, respectively.
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 armed forces are "up to speed" with other Western nations, in the words
 of one official, both in personnel and hardware performance.
 Closely associated with the loss of joint military training have been
 three other losses: the inability to obtain new and evolving defense doc-
 trines from the Western powers, the loss of American intelligence sharing,
 and the downgrading of New Zealand military training at American com-
 mand and staff schools. Since the break in military ties, New Zealand is
 prohibited from receiving U.S. military and intelligence information. In
 turn, Australia, the other member of the ANZUS pact, is restricted from
 sharing with New Zealand any information that the United States shares
 with the Australians. Changes in doctrines and changes in strategies that
 have been adopted by the U.S. will no longer be shared with New Zea-
 land. As such, sea patrols and air flights by New Zealand forces, for exam-
 ple, would not have the same kind of information that may make them a
 more effective force in the South Pacific region. Finally, New Zealand mil-
 itary officers also were initially denied access to the command and staff
 colleges operated by the U.S. military (e.g., U.S. Army Command and
 General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas). In 1990, the Bush
 administration eased up on this restriction a bit by inviting one or two offi-
 cers a year to go to these schools. One New Zealand air force officer, for
 instance, reportedly attended the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force
 Base, Alabama in 1994.14 Still, the level of cooperation in this area remains
 modest.
 A further military impact for New Zealand has been the loss of ready
 access to resupply of needed military materials. As a member of an
 alliance, New Zealand was in a preferred position for such resupply, but
 this is no longer the case. Ready resupply was particularly important for a
 country like New Zealand which traditionally has kept low inventories and
 which has generally relied upon its ability to get "on the phone" to the
 U.S. - in the words of one New Zealand official - if an emergency arose.
 Now, New Zealand must spend more on purchasing larger supplies,
 increase its stockpiles, and "get in line" with other countries for military
 procurements.
 The final military change for New Zealand has been the greater
 reliance on Australia and on its Five Power Defense Pact for its principal
 security needs.'5 While relations are surely friendly and cooperative be-
 tween New Zealand and Australia, New Zealand is now much more
 14 Interview at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, February, 1994.
 15 See The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper
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 dependent for its security on Australia through both the development of
 the Closer Defense Relationship (CDR) and through the purchase of mil-
 itary equipment from Australia. Important in this connection, of course,
 has been the development of the joint Australian-New Zealand frigate
 project. While that project did receive approval in the late 1980s from the
 Labour government, the project generated considerable controversy at
 the time.'6 As recently as July 1993, the project generated more contro-
 versy as well, when former Prime Minister David Lange called for the
 rejection of the two frigates that New Zealand was to purchase from
 Australia.
 The Five Power Defence Arrangement among Australia, New Zea-
 land, Britain, Malaysia, and Singapore remains an important component
 of its defense policy, but its benefits are limited compared to those that
 accrued from the ANZUS pact. While Singapore has been a major exer-
 cise area for the New Zealand military, the New Zealand government's
 decision to bring home its battalion stationed on Singapore has further
 eroded the degree of military cooperation and integration with other
 forces.
 Although the immediate military effects from the rupture in the
 ANZUS alliance fall more on New Zealand than the United States, the
 U.S. does feel some military fallout from this change.'7 To be sure, the
 immediate, direct military impact to America's security interests or influ-
 ence in the Asia-Pacific region is only minimally affected by the rupture
 in ties. The real impact on the U.S. is more in the realm of the intangible
 than the tangible. At a time in which the United States is trying to convey
 to the rest of the world, and to the Asia-Pacific in particular, that it wants
 to remain both a global power in general and a Pacific power in particu-
 lar, one important South Pacific link remains seriously weakened. While
 the American government likes to cite its ties with Australia and with
 members of the Five Power Defense Arrangement as a crucial link in the
 region,'8 some gaps in an American presence still exist with the rupture
 in the ANZUS pact. As limited as U.S. ship visits were to New Zealand,
 they did have the tangible effect of "showing the flag" and the intangible
 effect of demonstrating America's global and Asia-Pacific posture. This
 opportunity has been lost since 1985.
 16 Dora Alves, "U.S.-New Zealand Relations: The National Government of New Zealand," Asian
 Survey, vol. 33 (November 1991), p. 1065.
 17 It should be noted that, despite the rupture in military cooperation between the two states,
 the U.S. continues to use facilities in Christchurch, New Zealand for its Antarctic activities.
 American military planes continue to land and take off from Christchurch, and New Zealand does
 not seek direct compliance with its nuclear weapons policy. See "New Zealand Overview"
 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, November 1992).
 18 Col. Ralph A. Cossa, "Promoting Peace and Stability Through Cooperative Engagement,"
 Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, vol. 17 (Spring 1993), p. 13.
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 This argument about the gap in American presence may have some
 more immediate relevance in the Asia-Pacific and at home. The Clinton
 administration has recently tried to address the issue of nuclear prolifer-
 ation in Northeast Asia and has sought to produce a united front among
 its allies against North Korea. Yet it would surely be more reassuring to its
 principal allies there (South Korea and Japan) if its ties with the Pacific
 region were solidified, and the ANZUS dispute addressed.
 In this sense, by continuing to move to shore up its ties with New
 Zealand (as the Clinton administration has now initiated) and provide
 tangible signs of alliance cohesion, South Korea andJapan (and others in
 Asia) will be more inclined to give credence to the administration's
 pledge to remain an Asia-Pacific power. In short, alliance stability across
 the Asia-Pacific region has suffered somewhat from the continued fissure
 in ANZUS.
 (b) Political Effects
 The political effects on the rupture over the ANZUS pact have been
 quite widespread and perhaps fall more equally on both countries than
 do the military effects. In the words of one New Zealand official, the
 impact has been "extensive and across the board" for his country. It
 has caused problems with Australia, with countries in the South Pacific
 (e.g., Fiji) and Asia and South Asia (e.g., Japan, Korea), and even prob-
 lems with traditional friends in Europe.
 Many of these countries cannot fathom how New Zealand would
 allow its access to the U.S. and, in turn, its access to a global posture to be
 undermined by its nuclear policy stance toward ANZUS. Some countries
 (e.g., Japan and Korea), too, are particularly anxious over this alliance
 break because of what it might portend for alliances and their reliability
 in the future. They, too, seem to have "a degree of puzzlement," in the
 words of one official, over why New Zealand and the United States have
 been unable to sort out their differences. Further, one New Zealand offi-
 cial allowed that the lack of progress seems to reflect more on New
 Zealand than on the United States.
 The specific political impact can be placed into two major analytic cat-
 egories: (1) New Zealand government officials (until early 1995) had no
 direct political access to the highest levels of the American government;
 and (2) these same officials also lacked routine access to lower levels of
 the U.S. government. The former kind of political effect can be summa-
 rized by one simple statement: No New Zealand prime minister had been
 received by an American president in Washington from 1984 until early
 1995. Not until March 27, 1995, when Prime Minister Jim Bolger was
 received by President Clinton at the White House, was this pattern
 broken.
 399
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 The effect of this eleven-year hiatus can perhaps be conveyed more
 fully by recalling the experience of the late Prime Minister Sir Robert
 Muldoon, the last New Zealand prime minister to visit the White House
 prior to Bolger. Not only did Prime Minister Muldoon lunch with Presi-
 dent Reagan and spend the afternoon talking with the president at the
 White House, but the morning had been spent by Muldoon and his aides
 with Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of the TreasuryJames
 Baker. In the view of one high New Zealand official wholly familiar with
 the visit, he proudly noted that the small island nation of New Zealand
 and its top officials were afforded the entire day by key U.S. foreign pol-
 icy makers during their brief Washington visit, an opportunity foreclosed
 for more than ten years by the ANZUS rupture.
 During this period of estrangement, New Zealanders are quick to
 point out, their prime minister was treated less well than the heads of
 many other nations, including many unfriendly ones.'9 Even those heads
 of government were rather routinely received by a U.S. president and
 accorded appropriate diplomatic protocols. New Zealand, however, was
 not. In this sense, the symbolic and practical significance of such Ameri-
 can actions is not lost on New Zealanders, and it created some surprise,
 and more, for many New Zealanders.
 To be sure, the New Zealand foreign ministers had the opportunity to
 visit Washington and to be received at the State Department. Deputy
 Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Don McKinnon, for instance, was
 received in Washington in March 1993 and met with officials at the State
 Department regarding important matters. Earlier, External Relations and
 Trade Minister Mike Moore and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker con-
 sulted in 1990.20 Still, the lack of consultations at the highest levels of the
 two governments has caused some uneasiness on the part of both sides.
 Yet the American embassy in Wellington makes clear that relations
 between the two countries operate very smoothly on a day-to-day basis,
 despite the rupture in ANZUS ties.
 Still, the political impact of this rupture for the U.S. mirrors some of
 the problems that New Zealand faced. Although the American position
 was to convey the notion that alliance is not free and that "free riders"
 19 There have been over the years some meetings where the U.S. president and the New
 Zealand prime minister were in joint attendance. The latest example of such joint participation
 was the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) meetings in Seattle during November 1993.
 The same had been the case for the postministerial meeting of the Association of South East Asian
 Nations (ASEAN) and at the United Nations.
 20 Alves, "U.S.-New Zealand Relations," p. 1064. Also see Kennaway, "The ANZUS Dispute," p.
 71.
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 cannot be tolerated, the attempt in some ways may have backfired. Some
 wondered why the United States continues to treat a friendly nation in
 such a high-handed way. The imagery of the large and powerful United
 States treating a small island nation like New Zealand so cavalierly was a
 point of considerable concern to many. Furthermore, the inability of the
 United States to negotiate a settlement over some time apparently had
 some effect on ties throughout the region and even beyond. As I noted
 earlier, the political effect was at least to raise considerable curiosity
 among Asian and Pacific partners of both nations.
 Indeed, a key American official does acknowledge that the situation
 between these two friendly nations was "absurd" and "uncomfortable."
 Yet, that official was also rather adamant in noting that alliance partners
 must be willing to share the burdens of security, including the presence
 of American military ships in New Zealand waters. While the U.S. would
 "welcome" New Zealand back to the alliance, the official said, the passage
 of the 1987 legislation, as opposed to only a statement of government pol-
 icy, has made the prospect of a quick settlement of the rupture much
 more difficult. As such, a full resolution of the dispute remains more long-
 term than immediate. Until the recent action of the Clinton administra-
 tion, the United States has not been willing to ease up pressure on New
 Zealand. According to the official policy position, any easing of political
 and diplomatic pressure would not make New Zealand confront the hard
 decisions necessary to resolve the dispute.
 (c) Economic Effects
 In the economic area, neither country seems to have suffered greatly
 from this dispute, but the degree of expansion in economic ties might
 have been even greater without this fissure in political and military rela-
 tions. While some members of the U.S. Congress talked about the use of
 economic sanctions as a retaliatory tool, the level of trade between the two
 countries has actually increased over the past decade. At the end of June
 1985, for example, the N.Z. dollar value of exports to the U.S. was about
 $1.6 billion, while imports from the U.S. totaled about $2.1 billion. By
 1989, exports had risen to $2.0 billion and imports were about the same at
 $2.1 billion. By 1992, the exports were at about $2.3 billion and imports
 were at about $2.6 billion.2' By about mid-1994, moreover, the U.S.
 received 12 percent of New Zealand exports, and New Zealand imports
 from the U.S. constituted roughly 18 percent of all foreign products.22
 21 The data are taken from the New Zealand Official Handbook (various years) and from The
 Europa World Yearbook 1993, Volume II (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1993), pp. 2098-99.
 22 Financial Times Survey: New Zealand, "Key Facts," Financial Times, June 8, 1994, p. 25.
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 While not directly linked to the ANZUS Crisis, trade relations have
 not been conflict free, however. New Zealand has been unhappy with the
 U.S. Export Enhancement Program (EEP), a program in "which the U.S.
 government subsidizes agricultural exports in an effort to compete with
 the EC and thus pressure the European states to change their subsidy sys-
 tem." By one assessment, this program has "been the most significant sin-
 gle issue on the bilateral economic agenda in recent years" between the
 U.S. and New Zealand. Similarly, the U.S. had been unhappy with New
 Zealand's actions on the GATT Subsidies Code, but this dispute was seem-
 ingly resolved by 1990.23
 A larger, lingering question has been over agricultural subsidies. New
 Zealand has now eliminated all forms of subsidies on its farm products
 and sees American farm support policies as giving the U.S. an unfair trade
 advantage. As such, New Zealand would prefer that the U.S. and other
 states follow its policy of free trade in agriculture. The recent completion
 of the Uruguay Round of GATT - a long time goal of New Zealand -
 may solve some of these differences, but frictions will likely remain.
 While the ANZUS effect on economic ties has been more indirect
 than direct, the rupture has had a direct impact on trade relations in one
 crucial way. "As a result of the ANZUS rupture," two analysts noted
 recently, "there is now no formal mechanism for regular high-level con-
 sultations on any issues, economic or otherwise. "24 To be sure, lower level
 exchanges occur regularly, and some higher-level contacts did take place
 in 1990 and 1991, but no routine high-level discussions take place. With
 the recent openings in high-level consultation in 1995, however, this situ-
 ation may now be changing.
 (d) Australia-New Zealand and the Rupture
 Although the U.S.-New Zealand effects of the rupture within ANZUS
 have been most notable, the third party in the alliance has not gone unaf-
 fected. In one sense, Australia has gained from the rupture in that now
 the United States is even more reliant upon that nation for anchoring its
 alliance policy in the South Pacific area. As such, military ties between the
 U.S. and Australia are even stronger than before the rupture. In another
 sense, of course, Australia has also suffered for, even as it seeks to provide
 23 This assessment of economic differences is drawn from Paul L. Laase, "United States Bilateral
 Economic Relations with Australia and New Zealand," in Richard W. Baker and Gary R. Hawke,
 ANZUS Economics: Economic Trends and Relations Among Australia, New Zealand, and the United States
 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992). The quotes and information are from p. 202.
 24 Richard W. Baker and Gary R. Hawke, "Implications for Relationships," in Baker and Hawke,
 ANZUSEconomzcs, p. 226.
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 support to New Zealand and the New Zealand military, Australia needs to
 be careful not to share any intelligence information gained from the U.S.
 with New Zealand and is prohibited from allowing the Kiwis to participate
 in any exercises with the Americans. Thus, even greater responsibility is
 placed on Australia with New Zealand now outside of active participation
 in the alliance activities.
 RECENT EFFORTS AT HEALING THE RwFr
 Since the election of the National government in 1990, efforts have
 been made by New Zealand to begin to heal the rift between the two
 states. At least three major attempts in progress are important to identify
 and discuss in some detail: (1) the use of a government-appointed com-
 mittee to investigate the safety of nuclear ships as a prelude to a recon-
 sideration of the questions of port visits; (2) tangible efforts at cooperat-
 ing with the West, including the United States, as a demonstration of their
 friendship with those states; and (3) a political initiative, largely led by
 Foreign Minister Don McKinnon and Prime MinisterfJim Bolger, to sepa-
 rate political and military differences with the U.S.
 Ship Safety Report
 An initial effort that the New Zealand National government under-
 took to reconsider this whole policy question was the establishment of a
 "Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion" in December 1991. The
 charge given this committee was to investigate the relative safety of
 nuclear-powered vessels and to consider the consequence of a release of
 radioactive material from them.25 Presumably, if nuclear-powered vessels
 were shown to be safe, an important element of the argument over ship
 visits would be weakened, and the prospect of progress with the U.S.
 could be enhanced. (The likelihood of this approach succeeding, more-
 over, was more fully enhanced when the Bush administration announced
 that it was removing nuclear weapons from all naval surface ships.26)
 The committee's investigation was an exhaustive and comprehensive
 one, covering many aspects of the issue. During the course of the investi-
 gation, the committee met "more than 20 times" and traveled to the
 United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Vienna (headquarters
 of the International Atomic Energy Agency) to talk with knowledgeable
 personnel about this issue.27 As a result of these extensive scientific and
 technological deliberations, the committee issued its report in December
 1992, reaching this central conclusion:
 25 The Safety of Nuclear Powered Ships, p. 1.
 26 ColinJames, "Glowing Report," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 7, 1993, p. 22.
 27 The Safety of Nuclear Powered Ships, p. 6.
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 The presence in New Zealand ports of nuclear powered vessels of the navies
 of the United States and the United Kingdom would be safe. The likelihood
 of any damaging emission or discharge of radioactive material from nuclear
 powered vessels if in New Zealand ports is so remote that it cannot give rise
 to any rational apprehension.28
 The report also noted that no other country hosting visits by nuclear
 powered vessels of these two countries had detected any release of radia-
 tion "to either the atmosphere or the sea." The United States and the
 United Kingdom have accepted "absolute liability for injury, death, or
 damage to or loss of property resulting from a nuclear accident in one of
 its vessels." Most powerfully, too, the report concluded its list of findings
 by noting that "there is a serious lack of understanding and knowledge,
 and much misinformation, in the minds of the public concerning safety
 and technical issues related to nuclear powered vessels."
 The findings of this report thus raised several different possibilities
 for policy shifts. Since the National party had changed its position on
 nuclear weapons and ANZUS prior to the October 1990 election, a rever-
 sal would be necessary. This report might facilitate and provide the nec-
 essary political cover forjust such a change. Similarly, this report might be
 used by the National government to facilitate a change in government
 policy, including a change in the 1987 New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone,
 Disarmament, and Arms Control Act.
 These possibilities for change soon evaporated. The New Zealand
 public continued to support the nuclear ban.29 Peace activists, even if they
 acknowledged the accuracy of the report, continued to oppose any lifting
 of the ban.30 Divisions within the National party, too, made it difficult to
 change course. Further, with an election looming, the prospect for policy
 change appeared remote.
 By June, 1993, moreover, Prime Minister Jim Bolger had apparently
 dropped the idea of using the committee's findings to reverse course.
 Instead, he reaffirmed National's commitment to the ship ban, and par-
 layed another strategy, one discussed below, for dealing with the rupture.
 In short, this first attempt at altering the New Zealand policy had largely
 proved stillborn.
 Cooperative Actions with the West
 The second approach by New Zealand was less a specific approach to
 facilitate policy change between the U.S. and New Zealand and more an
 effort to demonstrate that it was a dependable friend of the West, includ-
 28 This quotation and the quoted materials in the next paragraph are from ibid., p. 173.
 29Jane Clifton, "Nuclear-free Policy Founded on 'Campaign of Fear,"' The Dominion, June 18,
 1993, p.2.
 30James, "Glowing Report," p. 22.
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 ing the United States. Hence, over the past several years, New Zealand has
 sought to support U.S. and other Western countries, whether it be in UN
 peacekeeping missions or in U.S.-led actions (e.g., the 1991 Persian Gulf
 War). In this way, New Zealand might be in a better position to negotiate
 some resolution to the ANZUS rupture with the United States.
 The cooperative actions where New Zealand and the United States
 have participated during the past decade have been considerable. They
 have cooperated in the UN Security Council (especially during the
 1993-1994 session when New Zealand assumed a seat in that body) and
 on peacekeeping efforts in several far-flung places - the Sinai,
 Cambodia, Angola, Somalia, and Bosnia. The two countries have worked
 together on multilateral efforts in the former Soviet Union, on security
 dialogue in the Asia-Pacific area, and within the APEC (Asia-Pacific
 Economic Cooperation) organization. More recently, New Zealand
 joined the emerging organization to implement the U.S./North Korean
 framework to address the nuclear threat in Asia. Similarly, too, New
 Zealand has been an advocate of unrestrictive renewal of the Nuclear
 Non-Proliferation Treaty, scheduled to expire in 1995.31
 For New Zealand, the aim of all these activities was to rebuild politi-
 cal trust and cooperation as a prelude to dealing with the ANZUS rup-
 ture. To some extent, these activities undoubtedly set the stage for the
 Clinton administration initiatives in 1994 and 1995. The United States
 apparently took cues from these cooperative measures to begin to alter
 the political climate, as we shall discuss shortly. Nonetheless, these activi-
 ties have not yet yielded a full resolution to the dispute.
 McKinnon-Bolger Initiative
 In May 1993, Foreign Minister Don McKinnon gave a public address
 in which he called for the renewal of ties with the United States, and the
 return to ANZUS by New Zealand. A month later, McKinnon spoke to the
 same issue in Parliament and gave a scathing indictment of the present
 policy. As he noted, "People do feel New Zealand has done something
 spectacular. I don't necessarily agree with that... We've sacrificed some
 very dramatic linkages New Zealand had had for more than 100 years,
 and we are still feeling the costs. When it all was done, the world was deaf-
 ening in its silence. Who congratulated us? The Soviet Union and
 Vanuatu. "32
 31 See the address by Rt. Hon.J. B. Bolger, "New Zealand and the United States: Partners in the
 Asia/Pacific Region," to the World Affairs Council Luncheon, Los Angeles, California, March 24,
 1995, and Congressman Eni F. H. Faleomavaega, "In Welcome of the Prime Minister of New
 Zealand, The Honorable Jim Bolger," U.S. House of Representatives, March 28, 1995.
 32 Quoted in Clifton, "Nuclear-free Policy," p. 2.
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 On June 8, 1993, Prime Minister Jim Bolger took a different tack,
 albeit with the goal of trying to improve ties between the two countries.
 Speaking to the American Chamber of Commerce in Wellington, Bolger
 reaffirmed New Zealand's commitment not to abandon its nuclear-free
 policy, but he suggested that a two-track policy approach be adopted by
 the U.S. and New Zealand to improve ties. In particular, he proposed a
 security track - where the U.S. and New Zealand would agree to disagree
 over nuclear ships - and a political track - where the two nations would
 seek to improve their ties with one another. The latter track would imply
 high-level consultation among political officials of the two countries: "It is
 therefore understandable that we look forward to the day when the New
 Zealand Prime Minister is also welcome in Washington." Further, he
 noted that "New Zealand has been a loyal and true friend of the United
 States - and we would like to see that fact recognised in political spheres,
 as it has been in the commercial sector."33
 The Clinton administration's reaction to this proposal was surely less
 than what New Zealand had wanted. At a news conference shortly after
 Prime Minister Bolger's proposal, President Bill Clinton was asked,
 "Would you consider meeting now with a New Zealand leader and dis-
 cussing the situation? Isn't there some way that a compromise can be
 reached so that you can agree to disagree but still restore the political and
 security relationships?"
 President Clinton's response was instructive on the nature of the rela-
 tionship at the time: "I've given absolutely no thought to that question.
 And I'm afraid if I give an answer to it, I'll be in more trouble than I can
 figure out.934
 Despite this response, Prime Minister Bolger placed an upbeat inter-
 pretation on the President's answer by indicating that he was glad that
 President Clinton had not rejected the proposal. Deputy Prime Minister
 and Foreign Minister Don McKinnon, however, said the Clinton response
 was the result of New Zealand not having full access to the U.S. govern-
 ment.35 The more formal U.S. embassy response to the Bolger proposal
 was hardly reassuring. It simply reaffirmed the fact that American policy
 toward New Zealand was "under review." As a result, no formal movement
 occurred on this proposal in the run-up to the 1993 election.36
 33 Quoted in "PM drops hint to Clinton," The New Zealand Herald, June 9, 1993, p. 1.
 34 Quoted in "PM Not Bothered by Nuke Response," Waikato Times, June 19, 1993, p.7, and
 "N-ban Not on Agenda," The New Zealand Herald, June 19, 1993, p. 1.
 35 Ibid., and "PM Not Bothered by Nuke Response," Waikato Times, June 19, 1993, p. 7.
 36 The only stir in the policy debate seems to occur over out-going American Charge d'Affaires
 David Walker's statement in August, 1993 that he hoped that a New Zealand prime minister would
 be able to visit the White House. As Walker later clarified this matter, he claimed that he was largely
 speaking in an optimistic way, rather than trying to signal any change in policy.
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 To some the 1993 election was thought to be the best opportunity for
 some change in policy between the two countries. If National were
 returned to power with a large majority, the government might have been
 in a position to change policy courses. Indeed, in the run-up to the elec-
 tion, several signs seemed to be pointing in the direction of National win-
 ning, albeit with a scaled-down majority: the economy was improving,
 inflation was low, and the New Zealand dollar was strengthening.
 Moreover, the New Zealand share market was rising as well.
 The November election results were undoubtedly shocking to
 National. It retained power by a razor-thin margin (50 seats for the gov-
 ernment, 49 for the opposition) and had to make substantial changes in
 the cabinet to hold its power together. Further, the choice of Helen Clark,
 a staunch supporter of the antinuclear policy, as the new opposition
 leader further lessened any prospect for immediate change in New
 Zealand policy.
 Another factor made greater immediate New Zealand initiatives on
 this rupture more remote as well: the selection of mixed-member pro-
 portional (MMP) in the 1993 election as the electoral system for the
 future.37 Modeled after Germany, this system provides that a party could
 gain representation in parliament by winning single constituencies (half
 of the seats in the parliament) and by winning at least 5 percent of the
 vote (the other half of the seats in the parliament). With speculation rife
 over the splintering of National and Labour and with two smaller parties
 (the Alliance and New Zealand First) already obtaining support, a coali-
 tion government after the next election seemed a real possibility.38
 Prospects of such a government being able to take significant initiatives
 on the antinuclear policy seem highly unlikely. Since antinuclear senti-
 ment is spread across the parties, albeit differentially, one of the first con-
 cessions of coalition partners on foreign policy would likely be on the
 nuclear policy question.
 By the end of 1993, then, all of the McKinnon-Bolger efforts at policy
 change had apparently come to nought. Efforts for improvement in rela-
 37 Trevor Burnard, "New Zealand Adopts MMP," New Zealand-United States Educational
 Foundatzon, vol. 1 (1994), pp. 12-13.
 38 In some respect, this coalition process has already begun. A parliamentary undersecretary
 left National in September 1994 to form his own party, eliminating National's one-seat majority.
 This member and his new party committed themselves to support the government on several key
 issues. In this sense, coalition government has already begun in New Zealand. On this develop-
 ment, see Colin James, "Quitting Season," Far Eastern Economic Review, September 29, 1994, p. 29.
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 tions seemed now to rest with the United States and the ongoing "policy
 review" begun by the Clinton administration after it took office.
 AN AMERICAN MovE
 By February 18, 1994, the Clinton administration policy review had
 apparently been completed. On that day, the administration announced
 a change in policy toward New Zealand. The United States government
 decided "to restore senior-level contacts between U.S. officials with their
 New Zealand counterparts for discussions on political, strategic and
 broad security matters." At the same time, the Clinton administration
 declared that "our decision to restore senior-level contacts does not sig-
 nify a restoration of our previous alliance with New Zealand nor does it
 foreshadow adjustments in other aspects of our previous security cooper-
 ation that have been curtailed." Yet, according to an American govern-
 ment official, this policy contact does not include "high-level" officials of
 the New Zealand government. A short time later, a New Zealand official
 was even more forthright and indicated that this policy change was hardly
 any change at all. In this sense, the policy was at best a slight opening-of-
 the-door for better relations between the two countries, but little else.
 Since the likelihood of immediate action on the part of the New
 Zealand government appeared slim in early 1994, the burden for further
 movement in restoring U.S.-New Zealand relations still largely fell to the
 American side. While the February 1994 opening was thus useful and wel-
 comed, it still was not a full and explicit implementation of a two-track
 policy by the Clinton administration. Yet, the adoption of such a policy
 course would hardly be without precedent in U.S. foreign policy.
 America, for example, has maintained good and stable political and
 military relations with Japan, even as economic disputes have raged for
 over a decade. U.S. ties with China operate on that same principle: sus-
 tained economic ties, "correct," but hardly cordial, political ties. More
 instructive, perhaps, is the case of French-American relations over the
 past three decades. Despite President Charles DeGaulle's withdrawal from
 the military structures of NATO, U.S.-French alliance ties within NATO
 remained intact. In other words, a dual track policy existed between these
 two allies: sustained political ties, ruptured military ties.
 Furthermore, and importantly, such a policy would not preclude the
 full restoration of military ties as relations begin to warm; indeed, it may
 well enhance the prospect of achieving that goal. That is, closer interac-
 tions between the two countries would be able to tap the reservoir of
 goodwill toward the U.S. within New Zealand and eventually move toward
 closer security ties as well. (Once again, increased American-French mili-
 tary cooperation in recent years is instructive.)
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 Indeed, by mid-1994 and early 1995, the United States had decided
 to take steps in this direction of a dual track policy. Winston Lord, the
 United States assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs, visited
 Wellington in late July 1994 for two days of talks with New Zealand offi-
 cials.39 Six months later in late January 1995, Deputy Secretary of State
 Strobe Talbott visited Wellington as well. Even more significant was the
 fact that Deputy Secretary Talbott carried an invitation for New Zealand
 Prime Minister Jim Bolger to visit Washington. That visit was completed
 in late March 1995, and Bolger was afforded time with President Clinton,
 Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and Secretary of Defense William
 Perry. By accounts from both sides, each was pleased with the visit and the
 exchange of views.
 The discussions held between Clinton and Bolger were indeed
 wideranging, covering discussions on renewal of the Nuclear Non-
 Proliferation Treaty, UN peace-keeping activities, the North Korean
 nuclear issue, and trade and investment matters. At the same time,
 President Clinton did indicate to Prime Minister Bolger that the New
 Zealand legislation prohibiting nuclear ship visits still prohibited the
 United States from having a full security relationship with New Zealand.
 Secretary of State Warren Christopher put it slightly differently: "We
 would like to be in a position to resume full military cooperation, and
 until that small bit of unfinished business is changed, we will not be able
 to do so. "40 Yet, the emerging American policy looked more and more like
 a dual-track approach to New Zealand.
 THE FUTURE IN U.S.-NEw ZEALAND RELATIONS
 With pressing global problems stretching from North Korea and
 Haiti to Bosnia and Russia, restoring full ties with New Zealand is not a
 high priority for the Clinton administration, yet these initial steps seem a
 clear movement away from a policy that was not cost free, either politically
 or militarily, for both parties. As we have outlined, New Zealand suffered
 considerably in political and military terms. While the emerging dual
 track approach begins to ease some of the political impacts of the rupture
 in ANZUS relations, the problems in the military area remain unresolved.
 Similarly, while some military dislocations remain for the United
 States, the political costs of the earlier policy are beginning to be
 39 See The Finanaal Times, August 1, 1994.
 40 Transcript of White House Briefing by Michael McCurry, March 27, 1995, and "Remarks by
 Secretary of State Warren Christopher and New Zealand Prime MinisterJames B. Bolger Prior to
 Their Meeting," Department of State, Washington, D.C., March 27, 1995.
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 addressed. No longer will America's inability to resolve this dispute tar-
 nish the stability of America's relationship with other countries in the
 Asia-Pacific region or its efforts to build a "Pacific Community." No
 longer, too, will the United States, fairly or not, be characterized as a large
 state seeking to bully a small state or as using a double standard in its deal-
 ing with New Zealand. Finally, too, this emerging policy is now more con-
 sonant with the end of the cold war and the drawing down of nuclear
 (and conventional) forces worldwide.
 Any further advancement in completing the restoration of full ties
 with New Zealand will likely require time and careful building on the
 beginning that the Clinton administration has now made. The
 Republican majorities in the House of Representatives and Senate are
 unlikely to be receptive to further concessions in this relationship on the
 part of the United States. (It is worth noting, however, that the chairman
 of the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs issued a
 warm and receptive statement on the occasion of Prime Minister Bolger's
 visit to Washington.) With an American presidential election rapidly on
 the horizon and with other pressing foreign and domestic issues con-
 fronting the Clinton administration, it, too, is unlikely to take any addi-
 tional initiatives toward New Zealand in the near term.
 Because the political and military costs of the past policy are borne by
 both countries, the New Zealand government must be prepared to seek
 further support across the major parties for greater accommodation
 toward the U.S. Some amending of the 1987 law appears to be the obvi-
 ous step to sustaining better political relations. The emphasis probably
 should be placed by making that law less a blanket prohibition and more
 one in which the prime minister - as the law reads - exercises more dis-
 cretion. With the change in the political system within New Zealand and
 the next elections scheduled for 1996, any initiatives by the Kiwis will also
 be delayed until after that vote. Even then, given the continued saliency
 of the nuclear issue within New Zealand, new initiatives will take some
 bold leadership. Yet, if the full resolution of this dispute - and full
 restoration of ties - are to occur, it will probably take nothing less.
 Iowa State University, April 1995
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